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Abstract
The paper studies the impact of altruism on Agent’s motivation in the
career concerns model. The paper shows the new channel of interaction
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The common point in the lit-
erature is that intrinsic motivation can be crowded out by the extrinsic
incentives. My paper shows that crowding effect can go in the opposite
direction: extrinsic incentives can be lessened for the intrinsically moti-
vated agent. The analysis shows that altruism can decrease effort, though
conventional wisdom suggests that effort should always be higher for the
more altruistic worker. The key for the result is the distinction between
current and anticipated altruism. The paper also studies the effect of
altruism on wage.
The model has a number of other interesting features. It gives an
example of winner’s blessing, it shows that ambitions can hinder altruistic
relation. The model can be naturally applied to the workplace relation;
another application is the local public good provision.
Keywords: Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation; Career concerns; Altruism;
Behavioral Economics.
JEL Classification Numbers: M52, D82, D64.
1 Introduction
Most of the contract and incentives theory literature is based on the selfishness
assumption - see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Laffont and Martimort (2002).
While economists typically posit self-interest, there is strong evidence from the
field and laboratory, suggesting that economic agents internalize the welfare of
the others. For instance, Andreoni (2006) provides a comprehensive survey of
evidence for philanthropy and public goods contribution. Rotemberg (2006)
surveys the evidence from the field. The prominent evidence for pure altruism
going from the lab is the Dictator Game introduced in Kahneman et al. (1986).
Overall, according to the experimental studies, some 50% of people demonstrate
altruism in their behavior - see Fehr and Schmidt (2003).
∗I’m grateful to Jean Tirole for support and encouragement. I’m also grateful to the
participants of the Behavioral and Experimental Economics workshop in Toulouse and to the
participants of the ASSET-2008 Conference for comments and suggestions.
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The fact that altruism of workers may be exploited to improve firm’s perfor-
mance is known to practitioners, in particular to the Human Resources Man-
agers. The popular point is that “business should use human nature to motivate
employee. Reciprocal altruism is part of our nature. Businesses should embrace
that and use it to their advantage by structuring a work environment that en-
courages such behavior” 1. Clearly, altruism is an important intrinsic motivator
for the workers. This motivates the study of the variants of the agency models,
which include the altruistic component in preferences.
My paper studies the impact of altruism on the Principal-Agent relation in
the career concern situation, in particular the interaction between extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation.
The model of the paper demonstrates the new channel of interaction between
intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. The literature typically stresses one channel
- the intrinsic motivation can be crowded out by the extrinsic incentives - see,
e.g. Fehr and Rockenbach (2003). My paper shows that crowding effect can
work in the opposite direction - an extrinsic incentive (career concerns) can be
lessened for the intrinsically motivated (altruistic) agent.
The evident consequence of the Agent’s altruism is partial internalization of
the Principal’s utility, which weakens moral hazard. It is also clear that, due
to this internalization, social welfare should be improved if altruistic relation is
established. However, the more detailed analysis uncovers more subtle features
of the impact of altruism.
The paper demonstrates that in the dynamic context it is important to
distinguish between the two types of altruism - current and anticipated, which
affect effort in the opposite directions. The former stimulates the Agent; this
results from the internalization of the Principal’s benefits, related to output.
The latter, on the contrary, lessens career concerns and weakens incentives.
Which type of altruism dominates depends on the parameters of the model -
relative uncertainty about Agent’s skill and relative importance of the future.
The intensity of altruism magnifies the prevalence of one of the altruism types.
In particular, if the anticipated altruism dominates, higher altruism makes its
dominance stronger which means that effort decreases with altruism.
The paper also demonstrates that altruism has two effects on wage. One
pushes wage upward because the altruistic worker is less sensitive to the mon-
etary payments from the subject-to-altruism Principal. Another pushes wage
downward due to self-compensation, resulted from the partial internalization if
the Principal’s utility.
Establishing altruistic relation is endogenous in the model: the Agent chooses
whether to accept an offer proposed by the subject-to-altruism Principal or an
offer from another Principal. The conditions for establishing the altruistic rela-
tion are obtained. It is shown that higher uncertainty about Agent’s abilities,
higher importance of the future and lower Agent’s altruism can prevent from
establishing the altruistic relation. It means, in particular, that the altruistic
Agent either establishes the non-altruistic relation first and then switches to
the altruistic one or establishes the altruistic relation and never switches. The
paper also shows that ambitions resulted from pushing himself too hard makes
it impossible to establish altruistic relation in the future whereas laziness is safe
for it.
1The Economist, Apr. 7, 2004 – ”The gift relationship”
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Interestingly, the paper provides an example of the ”winner’s blessing”.
The model of the paper allows different interpretations. One is labor con-
tract between friends or relatives. Another is local public good procurement
by the insider producer which internalizes benefits from the produced public
good (unlike the outside provider). The case of the agent possessing financial
stake gives one more application of the model. The first interpretation is used
throughout the paper for illustrative purposes.
Related Literature
My paper contributes to the quite new stream of literature which can be called
”behavior agency theory”.
Altruism is a psychological feature of the human beings. Behavioral eco-
nomics stresses the role of psychology in economic interactions and personal
decision making. The interaction in the workplace is a person-to-person inter-
action, so psychological features can be important.
Rotemberg (1994) considers the 2-stage interaction of the two economic
agents in which they choose their degrees of altruism with respect to each other
and then play the 2*2 Prisoner’s Dilemma. Importantly, the paper shows that
altruism can emerge endogenously when the Agent is given the opportunity to
choose between altruism and selfishness. The paper also shows that altruism
emerges in the equilibrium when the workers are paid on the basis of the joint
output. In the traditional models, the joint performance evaluation leads to
moral hazard in teams. As a result, the workers exert suboptimal effort. How-
ever, in the presence of altruism effort levels are higher and workers are better
off. Rotemberg argues that altruism may in fact emerge through the means of
socializing between the workers.
A number of contributions on the role of psychology in the workplace relation
has been made recently. They, however, focus on envy or spitefulness. The
literature may be divided into two groups. One studies different aspects of envy
of the Agent with respect to the Principal. Another considers multi-Agent setup
with Agents envious (e.g. inequality-averse) with respect to each other.
Itoh (2004) considers the Principal-Agent relation with other-regarding pref-
erences from the Agent as well as from the Principal side. The Agent is assumed
to be spiteful with respect to the Principal. The paper finds that the Princi-
pal’s payoff decreases as Agent’s spitefulness increases whereas wage increases
with spitefulness, which is quite natural. More subtle results is that in the
multi-agent case with agents spiteful to each other the Principal can exploit the
other-regarding nature of the Agents by designing the appropriate contract.
Dur and Glazer (2004) consider the model with Agent which is envious to
the Principal. The paper shows there are two effects of envy affecting effort in
different directions. Envy reduces effort for a given incentive but in equilibrium
the Principal provides higher incentives. So, the overall effect is not clear. It
depends on risk-aversion and properties of the envy functional form. In some
cases envy can make profit-sharing optimal even if effort is contractible.
Bartling and von Siemens (2006) consider the model with 2 agents working
in team. Wages are conditioned on team output. The workers are inequity-
averse and envious to each other. The paper concludes that envious agents
suffer if other agents receive higher wage due to random performance shocks.
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The necessary compensation for expected envy renders incentive provision more
expensive, which generates a tendency towards flat-wage contracts.
The analysis of Goel and Thakor (2003) demonstrates difference in optimal
contract design for envious agents and shows envy has two impacts affecting in
different directions.
An interesting example is provided by Grund and Sliwka (2005). The paper
considers other-regarding preferences in the framework of tournaments. It is
argued that the inequality averse agents dislike the inherent inequality of the
tournament, so they have to be compensated for it through increase in wage. On
the other hand, this inequality aversion creates extra incentive to exert effort.
A critical survey of the theories of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives and
evidence are provided by Fehr and Falk (2002). It is clear that intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation interact in the non-trivial way, in particular the literature
shows that intrinsic motivation can be crowded-out by extrinsic motivator such
as high-powered wage scheme - see the model in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) in
which extrinsic motivation crowds-out intrinsic incentives because it influences
the agent’s self-respect or social reputation. Sliwka (2007) provides a model in
which high-powered extrinsic incentives signal about dishonesty acceptance in
social norms and hinder workers’ intrinsic incentives. The experiment in Falk
and Kosfeld (2006) shows that a principals decision to control has a negative
impact on the agents motivation. Interestingly, unlike the literature cited above,
this paper provides an example where intrinsic motivator lessens extrinsic mo-
tivation.
2 The model setup
Consider the Principal-Agent two-period relationship as in Holmstrom (1999)
career concerns model. Workers (agents) are characterized by their type (skill
or talent) 휃. Assume for simplicity that 휃 is not known neither by the Agent nor
by the Principal. There is common prior belief that 휃 is normally distributed:
휃 ∼ 푁
(
휃, 휎2휃
)
In each period 푗 = 1, 2 the Agent chooses effort level 푎푗 . Output level is
determined by
푦푗 = 휃 + 푎푗 + 휀푗
Output noises 휀푗 are identically distributed, independent from each other
and from 휃. Each of them is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 휎2휀 :
휀 ∼ 푁
(
0, 휎2휀
)
Effort is costly. The cost function 퐶(푎) is assumed to be increasing, convex,
with no cost at zero effort:
퐶′(푎) ≥ 0, 퐶′′(푎) ≥ 0, 퐶(0) = 0, 퐶′(0) = 0.
Assume that there are many workers and managers and that there is recip-
rocal altruism in only one pair worker-manager. It means that there is one
particular worker who is altruistic to one particular manager and vice versa,
whereas there is no altruism in any other worker-manager pair.
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To justify such exclusivity of the altruistic relation consider an example of
two friends, one of them is an entrepreneur, looking for an engineer for his
enterprise, the other is an engineer. There are many other enterprises which
need engineers to hire and many other engineers seeking for the job. There is
no friendship relation in any other pair entrepreneur-engineer. Of course, one
can think of another form of a social relationship.
So, the two altruistic persons have an opportunity of establishing the al-
truistic relation, but each of them also has an outside option to establish the
non-altruistic relation with someone else. The existence of the outside option
captures the fact that altruism is not universal – the person is not altruistic to
everyone.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the first period the managers
offer salaries to workers. The salaries may be worker-specific; take-it-or-leave-it
offers are made. After this, each worker chooses a manager, whose proposal he
accepts. The output produced by each worker in the first period is observed
by everyone. On the basis of this observation, all workers and managers make
an inference on the workers’ type. At the beginning of the second period all
the managers again make worker-specific salary offers, then each worker chooses
manager.
The own utilities of Agent (worker) and Manager obtained in each period
are:
푢푗 = 푤푗 − 퐶(푎푗)
푣푗 = 푦푗 − 푤푗
The Manager’s and Worker’s total (social) utilities obtained in period 푗 are
given by
푈푗 = 푢푗 + 훽푣푗 = 푤퐴푗 − 퐶
(
푎퐴푗
)
+ 훽
(
푦푀푗 − 푤푀푗
)
푉푗 = 푣푗 + 훼푢푗 = 푦푀푗 − 푤푀푗 + 훼
(
푤퐴푗 − 퐶(푎퐴푗 )
)
where the parameters 훼 and 훽 (0 ≤ 훼, 훽 ≤ 1) will be referred to as altruism
parameters. The altruistic person partially internalizes the gains of another
person. It is assumed that the altruism parameters 훼 and 훽 are known to
everybody.
The following notation is used: 푦푀푗 is output obtained by Manager, 푤푀푗
is salary paid by Manager, 푤퐴푗 is salary received by Agent, 푎퐴푗 is effort level
exerted by Agent.
Note that in general there are two possibilities: 1) altruistic worker works
for altruistic manager or 2) altruistic Worker works for another manager and
another worker works for altruistic Manager. The first is said be the altruistic
relation. The second is said to be the non-altruistic relation. In the analysis
of the altruistic relation the latter is considered as an outside option for the
former.
In the first (altruistic) case 푤푀푗 = 푤퐴푗 and we will refer to this salary level
as “altruistic salary” and denote it as 푤퐴푗 . The effort exerted by the Agent
in period 푗 is used to produce output. This effort level will be referred to
as “altruistic effort” and denoted as 푎퐴푗 . Output obtained by the Manager is
referred to as “altruistic output”.
In the second case, when the altruistic relation is not established, the Man-
ager hires another worker and the Worker goes to another manager. For the
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two pairs the non-altruistic relation is established. It is clear that the relations
established are totally equal, which means that salaries paid by the Manager
(to another worker) and received by the Agent (from another manager) are be
at the same level2. This is true also for effort level and output. We will de-
note corresponding levels as 푤푁퐴푗 , 푎
푁퐴
푗 and 푦
푁퐴
푗 . They will be referred to as
“non-altruistic” levels.
The symbols without indexes 퐴 or 푁퐴 will be used to denote the equilibrium
values of parameters.
The two-periods utility for each agent is given by
푈 = 푈1 + 훿푈2 (푉 = 푉1 + 훿푉2)
where 훿 > 0 is the relative value of the 2-nd period utility with respect to the
1-st period utility. Notice that 훿 ≥ 1 is possible as well as 훿 < 1. The latter
is the case in the model with time discounting. The former is reasonable if, for
example, the first period (trial, untenured job) is shorter than the second period
(permanent, tenured job).
The Managers and the Workers maximize their respective two-period total
utilities.
3 Efficiency
The Pareto-optimal level of effort is given by
Lemma 1. The First-Best level of effort is determined by
퐶′
(
푎퐹퐵
)
= 1
and doesn’t depend on the level of altruism.
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Notice that the First-Best effort level doesn’t depend on the altruism pa-
rameters. In particular, it coincides with the First Best for the ”standard”
non-altruistic relation. So, if selfish utilities are considered instead of ”social”
utilities, the First Best effort will be the same.
It is also interesting to note that the utility possibility set under the optimal
effort level is given by:
(1− 훼)푈퐴 + (1− 훽)푈푀 ≤ (1− 훼훽)
(
푎퐹퐵 + 휃 − 퐶
(
푎퐹퐵
))
This means, in particular, that the sum of utilities 푈 + 푉 may achieve any
level through monetary transfers (wage). For example, if the Manager is more
altruistic than the Worker, 훼 > 훽, then increasing the wage to +∞ increases
also the sum 푈 + 푉 to +∞. Note that in this case 푈 → +∞ and 푉 → −∞.
This makes the utilitarian First Best analysis in the presence of the altruism
somewhat ambiguous.
2but the altruistic worker would receive the salary from another manager.
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1−αβ
1−α
(a∗ − C(a∗) + θ)
1−αβ
1−β
(a∗ − C(a∗) + θ)
Figure 1: Utility Possibility set
4 Equilibrium
To find an equilibrium of the 2-stage game, we proceed backward.
At the beginning of the first period, there is the prior belief for distribution
of worker talent. As stated above,
휃 ∼ 푁
(
휃, 휎2휃
)
At the end of the 1-st period, the output is observed, and update for the
distribution of the talent parameter 휃 is made. It will be shown below that this
update doesn’t depend on the type of the relation, established in the 1-st period
(altruistic or not).
4.1 Period 2
First, beliefs on the Worker talent are updated. Since the worker doesn’t know
his type at the beginning of the first period, the effort choice and the Manager’s
belief don’t depend on 휃. The following standard lemma describes how the
beliefs are updated.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the Manager believes that the 1-st period effort level
is 푎휇1 while the actual effort is 푎1. Then:
1. The Managers update their beliefs on the distribution of the worker’s type
휃 according to the formula:
휃 ∼ 푁
(
휃푀2 , 휎
2
휃
)
휃푀2 = 휆 (푦1 − 푎
휇
1 ) + (1 − 휆)휃 (1)
2. The Worker updates his belief on the distribution of his own type 휃 ac-
cording to the formula:
휃 ∼ 푁
(
휃퐴2 , 휎
2
휃
)
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휃퐴2 = 휆(푦1 − 푎1) + (1− 휆)휃 (2)
where
휆 =
휎2휃
휎2휃 + 휎
2
휀
Proof is standard. See, e.g. Holmstrom (1999).
The parameter 휆 may be interpreted as the relative uncertainty of the
worker’s talent. There are two sources of the uncertainty in the model – worker’s
talent and noise in output. The higher the variance of the distribution of talent
휃, i.e. the higher the uncertainty on 휃, the higher is 휆. And 휆 grows up to 1 as
the uncertainty on 휃 increases. When the worker’s talent is known for sure, the
relative uncertainty of talent 휆 = 0.
Notice that the worker belief update doesn’t depend on the actually exerted
effort. In fact, any increase in effort results in the same increase in output, so
the difference 푦1 − 푎1 in formula (2) is nor affected. If 휃 is worker’s true type
then formula (2) may be rewritten as
휃퐴2 = 휆 (휃 + 푎1 + 휀1 − 푎1) + (1− 휆)휃 = 휆 (휃 + 휀1) + (1− 휆)휃
Notice also that if the worker exerts higher (lower) effort, compared to what
he has been expected, his own update isn’t affected, but the Manager’s update
is.
Consider now effort choice and wage setup in the second period. There are
two possibilities: to establish altruistic or non-altruistic relation.
The Non-altruistic relation
If the non-altruistic relation is established, the altruistic Agent’s program is
max
푎2
{
−퐶(푎2) + 푤
푁퐴
2 + 훽푣
푁퐴
2
}
The altruistic worker still cares about the Manager’s wealth, even though
they are not working together – this is why we have the term 훽푣푁퐴2 , where
푣푁퐴2 is the utility, obtained by the the Manager, when he hires a non-altruistic
worker. Evidently, this term doesn’t depend on the altruistic Worker’s decision.
The non-altruistic workers’ program is the same with 훽 = 0.
The non-altruistic effort level (exerted by non-altruistic workers as well as
by the Altruistic Worker) is
푎푁퐴2 = 0 (3)
The non-altruistic Managers’ expected utility is
푉 푁퐴2 = 퐸
푀
2 [푦˜2 − 푤˜2] = 퐸
푀
2
[
휃 + 푎푁퐴2 + 휀2 − 푤˜2
]
= 휃푀2 − 푤˜2
Here 푦˜2 is the output obtained by manager and 푤˜2 is the wage, paid to the
Worker by one of the managers. Since there is competition between managers
a`-la Bertrand, it should be 퐸푀2
[
푉 푁퐴2
]
= 0, so that the non-altruistic wage
offered to each worker is
푤푁퐴2 = 휃
푀
2
The utility levels obtained under the non-altruistic relationship are:
푉 푁퐴2 = 0 + 훼휃
푀
2 (4)
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푈푁퐴2 = 휃
푀
2 + 훽 ⋅ 0 (5)
The altruistic Manager gets extra utility due to positive own utility of the
Worker.
Notice that the Managers’ belief (not the Worker’s!) determines the worker’s
utility in (5).
The Altruistic Relation
The Agent’s expected utility level obtained in the 2-nd period is
푈2 = 퐸
퐴
2
[
푤퐴2 − 퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
+ 훽(푦퐴2 − 푤
퐴
2 )
]
=
= 퐸퐴2
[
푤퐴2 − 퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
+ 훽
(
휃 + 푎퐴2 + 휀2 − 푤
퐴
2
)]
=
= 훽푎퐴2 − 퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
+ (1− 훽)푤퐴2 + 훽휃
퐴
2
The Agent’s program is then
max
푎2
{
훽푎2 − 퐶(푎2) + (1− 훽)푤
퐴
2 + 훽휃
퐴
2
}
Again, as for the non-altruistic relation, the solution doesn’t depend on the
wage.
The altruistic effort level in the second period is given by
퐶′
(
푎퐴2
)
= 훽 (6)
So, we obtain the following characterization of the altruistic relation in the
2-nd period, which is also true for the one-period interaction.
Lemma 3. In the last period (or in the one-period interaction), the effort is
given by (6).
Effort increases with altruism.
Notice that the effort level doesn’t depend on the inference on the type 휃.
Claim 1. In the last period, the Altruistic relation is more efficient than the
non-Altruistic one.
Indeed, the effort of the altruistic worker, determined by (6), is closer to
the optimal effort (퐶′
(
푎퐹퐵
)
= 1) than the effort of the non-altruistic worker(
푎푁퐴2 = 0
)
. Still, the altruistic effort level is suboptimal.
Utilities obtained under the altruistic relation by the Worker and by the
Manager correspondingly are given by
푈퐴2 = 푤
퐴
2 − 퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
+ 훽
(
퐸퐴푦퐴2 − 푤
퐴
2
)
= 푤퐴2 − 퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
+ 훽
(
휃퐴2 + 푎
퐴
2 − 푤
퐴
2
)
(7)
푉 퐴2 = 퐸
푀푦퐴2 − 푤
퐴
2 + 훼
(
푤퐴2 − 퐶
(
푎퐴2
))
= 휃푀2 + 푎
퐴
2 − (1− 훼)푤
퐴
2 − 훼퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
(8)
Consider now the possibility of establishing the altruistic relation in the
second period on the equilibrium path.
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Lemma 4. On the equilibrium path, 휃퐴2 = 휃
푀
2 (= 휃2) and in the 2-nd (last)
period:
1. The altruistic relation is always established.
2. The worker gets utility 푈2 = 휃2
and receives wage
푤퐴2 = 휃2 −
훽
1− 훽
푎퐴2 +
1
1− 훽
퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
Proof is given in the Appendix.
From Claim 1 we can conclude that if the beliefs of the worker and the
managers coincide, then altruism always leads to the efficiency improvement in
the 2-nd period.
For the analysis of possible deviations from the Equilibrium path it is im-
portant to consider the period 2 decision making when beliefs of the Worker
and the managers on the worker’s type are different.
Lemma 5. If worker’s effort in the 1-st period 푎1 differs from the managers
beliefs on the effort, conditioned on choice of the Altruistic (non-Altruistic)
relation in the 2-nd period 퐴퐿 (퐴퐻), and, consequently, beliefs of the worker and
the managers on the worker type distribution after the 1-st period are different,
then in period 2:
1. The altruistic relation is established iff
푎1 ≤ 퐴퐿 +
퐴퐻 −퐴퐿
훽
2. The non-altruistic relation is established iff
푎1 ≥ 퐴퐿 +
퐴퐻 −퐴퐿
훽
= 퐴퐻 +
(
1
훽
− 1
)
(퐴퐻 −퐴퐿)
3. The utilities obtained by the Worker under altruistic and non-altruistic
relation are
푈퐴2 = 휃 + 휆푎1 − 휆 ((1− 훽)퐴퐿 + 훽푎1)
푈푁퐴2 = 휃 + 휆푎1 − 휆퐴퐻
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Notice that the Utilities obtained by the Worker may be rewritten as 푈퐴2 =
(1−훽)휃푀2퐻+훽휃
퐴
2 and 푈
푁퐴
2 = 휃
푀
2퐿, where 휃
푀
2퐻 and 휃
푀
2퐿 are the Managers’ updated
beliefs, conditional on the relation type choice in the 2-nd period.
The first case in the lemma appears after a first period downward deviation
or not too high upward deviation. It appears, for example, when the worker is
lazy at the 1-st period and exerts less effort than it is expected by the Manager.
In this case altruistic relation at the 2-nd period is established.
The second case appears after high enough upward deviation, i.e. when the
worker exerts much more effort than he is expected to. He did this on the
purpose to cheat the market by making the others believe he is very productive
(or talented). In this case he becomes ambitious in the 2-nd period and wants
higher wage. He knows that any manager gets less output than he expects but
pays high wage according to the expectation. The worker sacrifices the losses
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that the subject-to altruism Manager might suffer and doesn’t sacrifice from
the losses of the non-altruistic ones. This forces the worker to establish the
non-altruistic relationship. In other words, the worker prefers to cheat anyone
but his friend Manager. In this case altruistic relation is severed.
Put differently, downward or laziness deviation is relatively safe to hold
friends working together. Whereas high upward deviation makes the Worker
ambitious and severs altruistic relation. This means, for example, that if al-
truistic relation has some additional value for the worker, not related to the
production process, it is more likely that he would be lazy rather than over-
working.
4.2 Period 1
The key difference from the period-2 interaction is that in the period-1 the
career concerns are presented. The decision, made in the period 1 (i.e. effort
level), affects the expected utility for the second period through updating the
Principal’s beliefs on the worker’s type 휃, based on the observed period-1 output.
So, when making the decision (i.e. choosing the effort), the worker cares not
only about period-1 utility, but also about the expected utility for the period 2.
The model may be summarized by the following sketch of the game tree (see
Figure 2).
P A
wA
1
, wNA
1
A
(*)
A
a˜A
1
PaA
1
A
wage wA
2
, wNA
2
;
belief ANAL , A
NA
H
A
A
a˜A
2
aA
2
A
NA
a˜NA
2
aNA
2
A
(**)
NA
a˜NA
1
PaNA
1
A
wage wA
2
, wNA
2
;
belief AAL , A
A
H
A
A
a˜A
2
aA
2
ANA
a˜NA
2
aNA
2
Figure 2: Sketch of the game tree
Comment to the game tree. Notation: P - Principal(s) move, A - Agent
move. Efforts with tilde and dashed nodes mean deviation from equilibrium
effort choice. Nature moves (output noise realizations) are not shown to keep
the tree simpler.
Importantly, the beliefs on the first period effort are based on the choice
of the relation type in the second period. Consequently, the 2-nd period wage
offers (푤퐴2 , 푤
푁퐴
2 ) are different for altruistic and non-altruistic relation choice in
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the 2-nd period. It is easier to think that the Principals observe the relation
type choice made by the worker in the 2-nd period (i.e. whether the worker goes
to the subject-to-Altruism Principal or to another one) and after this update
their beliefs on the 1-st period effort and afterwards on the worker’s type.
Proposition 1. There exists pure strategies Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium which
is characterized by the following efforts and beliefs:
1. The beliefs on the effort choice in 1-st period are conditional on the relation
type chosen in the 2-nd period;
2. 푎퐴퐿 , 푎
푁퐴
퐿 are the actually chosen efforts under the altruistic and non-
altruistic relation in the 1-st period correspondingly; these efforts are con-
ditional on the choice of the altruistic relation in the 2-nd period.
These efforts are determined by
퐶′
(
푎푁퐴퐿
)
= (1− 훽)훿휆 퐶′
(
푎퐴퐿
)
= (1− 훽)훿휆+ 훽
3. 푎퐴퐻 , 푎
푁퐴
퐻 are the potential efforts choices (which are never realized, they
only support equilibrium) under the altruistic and non-altruistic relation
in the 1-st period correspondingly; these efforts are conditional on the
choice of the non-altruistic relation in the 2-nd period. They are
determined by
퐶′
(
푎푁퐴퐻
)
= 훿휆 퐶′
(
푎퐴퐻
)
= 훿휆+ 훽
4. Managers’ beliefs 퐴∙∙ coincide with the effort levels.
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Notice that the worker may exert an overoptimal effort in the 1-st period
due to high career concerns. The result is similar to one obtained by Holmstrom
(1999). However, in the presence of altruism, the excessive effort is softened;
whereas in the case of underprovision of effort, altruism incentivizes the worker.
So, effort is always closer to the optimum in the presence of altruism. The last
step in the analysis is the choice of the relation type for the 1-st period. It is
characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. 1. The altruistic relation is established in the 1-st period iff
it’s more efficient than the non-altruistic relation, i.e. iff
Δ퐶 ≤ Δ푎
where
Δ퐶 = 퐶
(
푎퐴퐿
)
− 퐶
(
푎푁퐴퐿
)
Δ푎 = 푎퐴퐿 − 푎
푁퐴
퐿
2. For a given 훽, the Altruistic relation is established iff
훿휆 < 푟(훽)
where 푟(훽) is an increasing function,
푟(0) = 1, 푟(훽) > 1 for 훽 > 0, lim
훽→1
= +∞
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Proof is given in the Appendix.
Figure 3 gives an illustration of the Proposition 2.
The straightforward corollary of the Proposition 2 is that the higher values
of the relative importance of the 2-nd period (훿), or the relative uncertainty
of the worker’s talent (휆) limit establishing the altruistic relation in the 1-st
period. Higher altruism is conducive to altruistic relation in the 1-nd period.
Notice that, despite the Agent internalizes only a part of the Principal’s
utility, this is enough to achieve the efficient outcome in the worker’s choice of
the relation type (though the choice is binary).
5 Discussion and Applications
This section complements previous formal analysis by developing economic in-
tuition on the impact of altruism and discusses applications of the model.
Recall that when altruistic relation is established at the 1-st period, effort
in equilibrium is determined by (see proposition 1)
퐶′(푎) = (1− 훽)훿휆 + 훽 (9)
Compare this with effort chosen by the non-altruistic worker (훽 = 0):
퐶′(푎) = 훿휆
and effort chosen by altruistic worker under the non-altruistic relation in the
1-st period:
퐶′(푎) = (1 − 훽)훿휆
The multiplier (1 − 훽) reflects reduced career concerns. It appears only for
the altruistic worker independently of the type of the relation established in
the 1-st period and is due to anticipation of establishing altruistic relation in
the future (2-nd period). The item (+훽) appears only if altruistic relation is
currently established and reflects a stimulating effect of it.
It is important to distinguish between current and anticipated altruism
as they have different nature and different impact on effort.
The two types of altruism are presented simultaneously when the altruistic
relation is established at the 1-st period. Indeed, in the 2-nd period the altruistic
relation is always established (see Proposition 4) so the anticipated altruism is
at work. The current altruism is clearly presented since current relation is
altruistic.
It is well possible that only anticipated altruism is presented. This is the
case when the non-altruistic relation is established in the 1-st period. Finally,
in the 2-nd period only current altruism is presented since altruistic relation is
always established and there is no future in the model.
However, in the real world the future always exists and the altruistic relation
is expected to be established, perhaps with some probability, so the anticipated
altruism is always at work. This is important to be noticed because current
altruism is somewhat evident whereas anticipated altruism is more subtle but
has an influence as well.
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Another way to illustrate the impact of altruism is to decompose the effort
choice in the 1-st period for the altruistic relation in (9) in the following way:
퐶′(푎) = 훿휆︸︷︷︸
effort of
non-altruistic
worker
− 훽훿휆︸︷︷︸
impact of
anticipated altruism
+ 훽︸︷︷︸
impact of current
altruism
(10)
The term 훿휆 represents the career concerns incentive, as in the model with
selfish workers. Second term 훽훿휆 shows that the career concerns incentive is
weakened for the altruistic worker. Finally, the third term 훽 represents the
incentive emerging from the intrinsic motivation of the worker.
Which altruism impact is stronger depends on the relative uncertainty of
worker’s skills 휆 and relative importance of the future 훿. The following claim
follows directly from equation (10) and Proposition 2.
Claim 2. 1. Higher levels of relative uncertainty about skills 휆, higher rela-
tive importance of the future 훿 and higher altruism level 훽 make anticipated
altruism stronger.
2. Only higher altruism level 훽 makes current altruism stronger.
3. Current altruism increases effort whereas anticipated altruism decreases
it.
4. Anticipated altruism is dominant iff 훿휆 > 1, i.e. the effort of the altruistic
worker is lower than that of the non-altruistic one. Altruistic or non-
altruistic relation can be established. Effort decreases with altruism but
has a jump when the type of the relation changes (see Figure 4- Left).
5. Current altruism is dominant iff 훿휆 < 1, i.e. effort of the altruistic worker
is higher than that of the non-altruistic one. Altruistic relation is always
established. Effort increases with altruism (see Figure 4 - Right).
The Claim states that the dominance of one of the altruism types is de-
termined by the career concerns 훿휆, rather than by altruism. The impact of
altruism is to magnify the prevalence of one of the altruism types. For instance,
if the anticipated altruism dominates, the higher altruism makes its dominance
over the current altruism more pronounced. Consequently, in this case effort de-
creases with altruism. If only anticipated altruism is presented, effort decreases
with altruism due to the magnification effect as well.
Figure 3 illustrates Claim 2 and Proposition 2. The horizontal line 훿휆 =
1 separates the regions of the current altruism and the anticipated altruism
dominance as followed from Claim 2. The area of the non-altruistic relation is
shaded. The separating line between the altruistic and non-altruistic relation
areas is determined by the function 푟(훽) from Proposition 2. Interestingly, the
optimal effort level is achieved only under the non-altruistic relationship.
Figure 4 may be considered as projections of figure 3. It shows effort as
function of the altruism parameter 훽. When 훿휆 > 1 effort is piece-wise de-
creasing but there is a jump corresponding to the switching from non-altruistic
to altruistic relationship. So, in general effort is not a monotone function of
altruism. When 훿휆 < 1 effort increases with 훽.
Now we turn to the analysis of how altruism influences wages.
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Figure 3: Type of relationship and dominant type of altruism.
Claim 3. A. There are two effects related to monetary compensation from the
Principal which is subject to altruism:
1. Decreased sensitivity to monetary payments: the altruistic Agent is harder
to attract by monetary payments from subject-to-altruism Principal.
2. ”self-compensation”: the altruistic Agent gets extra utility due to extra
output resulted from extra effort and requires less monetary compensation.
B. The two effects work in the opposite directions.
To prove the claim, point out that the difference in wages of altruistic and
non-altruistic workers is given by the formula:
Δ푤 =
Δ퐶
1− 훽
−
훽Δ푎
1− 훽
(11)
where Δ푤 = 푤퐴 − 푤푁퐴, Δ퐶 = 퐶
(
푎퐴
)
− 퐶
(
푎푁퐴
)
, Δ푎 = 푎퐴 − 푎푁퐴
There is a natural interpretation of the wage difference formula (11). Increase
in wage for the altruistic worker not only means an increase in his own utility
(one-for-one) but also a decrease in the altruistic part of his utility related to
Principal’s wealth decrease (in 훽 for 1 proportion). So, the overall effect of
wage increase for the worker’s total utility is only (1 − 훽) : 1, i.e. to increase
his utility by 1 unit (in order to compensate for effort disutility) the required
wage increase is 11−훽 monetary units. As a result, to compensate marginal cost
of extra effort in altruistic relation, the wage increase should be more than
monetary equivalent of the cost. The more altruistic the worker is, the higher
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Figure 4: Effort level as function of altruism. Left - case 훿휆 > 1, Right - case
훿휆 < 1.
is difference between extra cost and extra payment required to compensate this
cost. This is captured by the multiplier 11−훽 > 1 before the term Δ퐶. This
justifies the first point of the Claim.
On the other hand, due to altruism the share 훽 of the output increase resulted
from the increased effort is incorporated into the worker’s utility. So, there is
partial “self-compensation” from the effort increase for the worker. Because
of this, the Manager may compensate the Worker less through the monetary
payments. Notice that the self-compensation is non-monetary effect. As a con-
sequence, the more altruistic the worker is, the stronger is the self-compensation
effect.
To sum up discussion related to wages, the altruistic worker’s motivation
comes not only from monetary rewards (as for the non-altruistic worker) but
also through the non-monetary effect. Moreover, the effectiveness of the material
rewards for the worker is lower for more altruistic worker. Consequently, due
to decreasing sensitivity effect, more altruistic worker requires more monetary
compensation to compensate the same disutility of effort. On the other hand,
due to the self-compensation effect, more altruistic worker requires less monetary
compensation for the same effort. the interaction of the two effects determines
the wage the altruistic worker gets.
As it was already pointed out in the discussion after Proposition (5), if the
worker exerts at the 1-st period more effort than he was expected, then he
becomes ambitious and altruistic relation in period 2 may not be established.
However, if the worker exerted less effort, altruistic relation still is going to
be established in the future. So, ambitions hinder altruistic relation whereas
laziness is safe to keep altruistic relation.
Another interesting feature of the model is ”winner’s blessing”. Indeed,
consider the two managers - one is subject to altruism another is not. They are
competing for the worker to hire him. Each of them offers some wage to attract
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the worker. If the subject-to-altruism manager wins this competition, he will
gain some rent. Indeed, his wage offer is such that by establishing altruistic
relation the Worker will get the same utility (or slightly higher) as if under
non-altruistic relation. However the outcome under altruistic relation is closer
to the First Best compared to the non-altruistic one (see Proposition 2) and all
the gains in overall utility goes to the winner (subject to altruism Manager).
As it was mentioned in the literature review, the model of the paper pro-
vides an example where intrinsic motivator (altruism) lessens extrinsic motiva-
tion (carrier concerns). Economical literature on motivation crowding as well as
psychological, sociological and management literature is concentrated on crowd-
ing out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic incentives. So, the paper provides
an interesting example when crowding out effect goes different way.
The model extension to T periods with 푇 ≥ 3 may be considered as a
sequence of two-period models with decreasing 훿푡, 휎휃푡 and as a consequence 휆푡.
One can see from Proposition 2 that only two scenarios are possible: either
the altruistic relation is established from the very beginning or the non-altruistic
relation is be established first and at some moment it switches to the altruistic
one. In the latter case, at the beginning effort decreases and it is below the non-
altruistic effort. At the moment of switching to the altruistic relation, effort
jumps and may be higher or lower than the non-altruistic effort. Then effort
decreases but more steadily than the non-altruistic effort. Starting from some
point if not from the moment of jump it will be more than the non-altruistic
one. This illustrates the impact of the two types of altruism. Under the non-
altruistic relation, only anticipated altruism is presented which pushes effort
downward. After switching to the altruistic relation, current altruism emerges
and pushes effort upward. Over time, effort declines due to decreasing career
concerns. Anticipated altruism lessens the rate of declining because it lessens
the cause of it.
The results of the paper can be applied to some issues in organizational
economics. In particular, the following questions can be addressed. Should
the Agent be informed about a possibility of working with subject to altruism
Principal (his friend or family member)? If yes - at which moment? Consider
the multiperiod setup. Assume that up to time 푡1 the Agent works with some
Principal (훽 = 0) and doesn’t know about a possibility of establishing altruistic
relation with the subject to altruism Principal (such possibility didn’t exist or
the organization designer didn’t inform the Agent). So, up to the moment
푡1 the Agent acts as the non-altruistic Agent. At time 푡1 the Agent learns
about possibility of establishing altruistic relation and may choose to change
the Principal. Assume that 훿푡1휆푡1 is high enough so that the altruistic relation
is not established. As a result, effort jumps down under the anticipated altruism
influence. Over time, 훿푡휆푡 decreases and at some moment 푡2 the Agent switches
to the altruistic relation. At this moment effort jumps upward. Starting from
this moment both altruism effects - anticipated and current are at work.
Figure 5 illustrates the dynamic of effort. It is clear that to avoid undesir-
able effort decline between 푡1 and 푡2 the Agent should be informed about the
possibility of establishing altruistic relation not earlier than he actually wants
to switch.
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Figure 5: The effort dynamics
Throughout the paper the friends’ labor contract interpretation was used.
Let us turn to another interpretations - local public good provision.
Assume that local government (Principal) wants to hire a public good provider.
After the public good is produced, it may be partially used by the producer if
it resides in the location . Consider, for example, road (or roads network) con-
struction. The road is long enough (or network is large) so that after it is
constructed, the producer will use only part of it. There is also an alternative
producer of the public good (the large nation-wide corporation) which is not
the resident of the locality, so it will not use public good after it is produced.
The local provider may produce the public good in some other location where
it doesn’t reside, so it won’t use this public good after production. Provision
of the public good is required for the two periods. The contract for the public
good provision lasts only one period and specifies compensation from the local
government to the provider. The provider is characterized by its skill 휃 and
chooses effort level 푎. The quality of the public good is 휃 + 푎 + 휀 where 휀 is
noise. The local public good provider uses share 훽 of the produced public good.
The public funds are used to build roads and as well to produce other public
goods. So, higher payments to the firm means lack of other public good provi-
sion. With this framework, the model analyzed in the paper may be applied. In
particular, one can conclude that under high uncertainty (훿휆 > 1) the highest
quality at the first period will be provided by the outside provider. However,
if due to some reason the inside provider should be hired, in order to obtain
higher quality of the public good, it shouldn’t be too involved (i.e. 훽 shouldn’t
be too high - see Figure 4).
Another possible application of the model is the case when Agent possesses
the financial stake. Consider a Manager who works at a firm and owns stakes
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of it. He may as well work at another firm, then the firm would have to hire
another manager which is assumed not to have stakes of this particular firm.
The higher monetary payments to the Manager will decrease firm profit and
as a consequence dividends or even firm stock market value. So, the manager
sacrifices to some extent monetary payments from the firm. So, the model
developed in the paper can be applied to describe behavior of such a manager.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider one-period interaction with perfect information. Utilities are
given by:
푈푀 = 푦−푤+훼(푤−퐶(푎)) = 휃+푎−푤+훼(푤−퐶(푎)) = 푎−훼퐶(푎)−(1−훼)푤+휃
푈퐴 = 푤−퐶(푎)+훽(푦−푤) = 푤−퐶(푎)+훽(휃+푎−푤) = 훽푎−퐶(푎)+(1−훽)푤+훽휃
The peculiarity of the model is that monetary redistribution through wage
payment leads to change of the size of the pie (sum of the utilities). So, in the
Pareto optimum not only effort level but also wage are to be determined.
Pareto-optimum is derived from the maximization program:
{
max
푎,푤
{훽푎− 퐶(푎) + (1 − 훽)푤 + 훽휃}
푠.푡. 푎− 훼퐶(푎)− (1 − 훼)푤 + 휃 ≥ 푢푀
The solution is
퐶′(푎퐹퐵) = 1
푤푃푂 =
2− 훼
2(1− 훼)
+
휃 − 푢푀
1− 훼
Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. To establish the altruistic relation both Principal and Agent should be
better off compared to the non-altruistic relation, i.e. two inequalities should
hold: {
푈퐴2 ≥ 푈
푁퐴
2
푉 퐴2 ≥ 푉
푁퐴
2
(12)
After substituting utility levels from (5), (4), (7) and (8) and rearranging we
obtain:
푤퐴2 ≥ 휃2 +
퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
− 훽푎퐴2
1− 훽
(13)
푤퐴2 ≤ 휃2 +
푎퐴2
1− 훼
−
훼
1− 훼
퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
(14)
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For the two inequalities to hold simultaneously the right-hand side of 14
should be greater than the right-hand side of 13. After rearranging the terms
we obtain the condition for establishing the altruistic relation:
푎퐴2 ≥ 퐶(푎
퐴
2 ) (15)
Since altruistic effort is given by (6): 퐶′
(
푎퐴2
)
= 훽 and 퐶′(⋅) is increasing
function, we have 퐶′
(
푎퐴2
)
≤ 훽 for all 푎 ≤ 푎퐴2 . Taking into account that 퐶(0) = 0
we have
퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
=
푎퐴
2∫
0
퐶′(푎)푑푎 ≤ 훽푎퐴2 ≤ 푎
퐴
2
which guarantees that condition (15)holds. So, the first claim is proved.
For the second claim note that since the Manager makes take-it-or-leave-it
offer, the Worker will obtain utility at the outside option level which is utility
under non-altruistic relation. So, the first inequality in (13) holds with equality.
This establishes the result.
Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. If non-altruistic relation is established, the worker gets utility
푈푁퐴2 = 푤
푁퐴
2 − 퐶
(
푎푁퐴2
)
+ 훽푣푁퐴2 = 휃
푀
2퐻 = 휆(푦1 −퐴퐻) + (1− 휆)휃 (16)
since 푎푁퐴2 = 0 - see (3), 푣
푁퐴
2 = 0; and 푤
푁퐴
2 = 휃
푀
2퐻 because there is competi-
tion a`-la Bertrand between Principals for establishing the non-altruistic relation.
If the altruistic relation is established, then the wage is set by the Manager
according to his belief about the outside option for the worker (see Proposition
4):
(1− 훽)푤퐴2 = (1 − 훽)휃
푀
2퐿 − 훽푎
퐴
2 + 퐶(푎
퐴
2 ) (17)
The worker’s utility if he accepts the offer is determined by (see (7) )
푈퐴2 = 푤
퐴
2 −퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
+ 훽
(
휃퐴2 + 푎
퐴
2 − 푤
퐴
2
)
= (1− 훽)푤퐴2 −퐶
(
푎퐴2
)
+ 훽
(
휃퐴2퐿 + 푎
퐴
2
)
which gives after substituting 푤퐴2 from (17)
푈2 = (1− 훽)휃푀2퐿 + 훽휃
퐴
2 = 휆(푦1 − (1 − 훽)퐴퐿 − 훽푎1) + (1− 휆)휃 (18)
Comparison of the two utility levels in (16) and (18) gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. Consider the game tree – see Figure 2. Let us start from the node marked
by (*) where NA relation is established in the 1-st period.
Equilibrium requires that the Altruistic relation is established in the 2-nd
period according to Proposition 4 and then effort should be equal to belief:
푎1 = 퐴
푁퐴
퐿 . To support equilibrium, a deviation in the 1-st period effort followed
by the choice of NA relation in the 2-nd period should coincide with belief:
푎1 = 퐴
푁퐴
퐻 at the out of equilibrium path.
20
Ua1AL AH AL +
AH−AL
β
A relation
in 2-nd period
NA relation
in 2-nd period
Consider the case 퐴푁퐴퐻 > 퐴
푁퐴
퐿 .
The following picture illustrates the proof.
If the Altruistic relation is going to be established at the 2-nd period, the
expected utility of the two periods is 3:
푈퐴1 = 푤1 − 퐶(푎1) + 훽 (푦˜1 − 푤1) + 퐸
퐴
1
[
푈퐴2
]
The term with expectation is computed in Proposition 5:
퐸퐴1 [푈2] = (1− 훽)휆푎1 + 휃 − (1− 훽)휆퐴
푁퐴
퐿
Substituting this we get
푈퐴1 = 푤1 − 퐶(푎1) + 훽(푦˜1 − 푤1) + (1 − 훽)휆푎1 + 휃 − (1− 훽)휆퐴
푁퐴
퐿 =
= (1 − 훽)휆푎1 − 퐶(푎1) + {푐표푛푠푡 [푎1]}
and the maximization program is
max
푎1≤퐴
푁퐴
퐿
+ 1
훽
(퐴푁퐴
퐻
−퐴푁퐴
퐿
)
{(1− 훽)휆푎1 − 퐶(푎1) + {푐표푛푠푡 [푎1]}} (19)
Solution should satisfy 푎∗1 = 퐴
푁퐴
퐿 so it has to be internal and is given by
퐶′(퐴푁퐴퐿 ) = 퐶
′(푎1) = (1 − 훽)휆
If NA relation is going to be established in the 2-nd period, then according
to Proposition 5
퐸퐴1 [푈2] = 휆푎1 + 휃 − 휆퐴
푁퐴
퐻
3since the non-altruistic relation is established, 푦˜1 denotes output obtained by subject-to
altruism Principal when another worker works for him. Analogously, the notation 푤˜1 is used.
Notice that 푦˜1 is NOT affected by the altruistic worker effort choice in the period 1
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and
푈퐴1 = 푤1−퐶(푎1) + 훽(푦˜1−푤1)+휆푎1+ 휃−휆퐴
푁퐴
퐻 = 휆푎1−퐶(푎1)+ {푐표푛푠푡 [푎1]}
The worker maximization program is
max
푎1≥퐴
푁퐴
퐻
+( 1훽−1)(퐴푁퐴퐻 −퐴푁퐴퐿 )
{휆푎1 − 퐶(푎1) + {푐표푛푠푡 [푎1]}} (20)
Notice that 퐴푁퐴퐻 > 퐴
푁퐴
퐻 +
(
1
훽
− 1
) (
퐴푁퐴퐻 −퐴
푁퐴
퐿
)
since 훽 < 1 and 퐴푁퐴퐻 >
퐴푁퐴퐿 . So, 퐴
푁퐴
퐻 ∕∈ [퐴
푁퐴
퐻 +
(
1
훽
− 1
) (
퐴푁퐴퐻 −퐴
푁퐴
퐿
)
; +∞). This means that it is
never possible to obtain solution 푎∗1 = 퐴
푁퐴
퐻 which means it is never possible to
have NA relation established in the 2-nd period at the equilibrium path.
Now consider the case 퐴푁퐴퐻 ≤ 퐴
푁퐴
퐿 . The two maximization programs are
the same but now the problem (20) has internal solution
퐶′
(
퐴푁퐴퐻
)
= 퐶′(푎1) = 휆
and problem (19) doesn’t have solution 푎∗1 = 퐴
푁퐴
퐿 ∈
[
0, 퐴푁퐴퐿 +
1
훽
(퐴푁퐴퐻 −퐴
푁퐴
퐿 )
]
.
Then NA relation is going to be established in the 2-nd period which contra-
dicts Proposition 4. This means that at the equilibrium path the beliefs should
satisfy 퐴푁퐴퐻 > 퐴
푁퐴
퐿 .
We have proofed so far that if altruistic relation is going to be established,
effort level is 푎1 = 퐴
푁퐴
퐿 . If deviation to NA relation in the 2-nd period is
considered then utility will not be lower than for effort 푎′1 = 퐴
푁퐴
퐻 because this
corresponds to the global maximum of (20).
Compare the 1-st period (maximized) expected utility levels for these two
possibilities .
For 푎1 = 퐴
푁퐴
퐿 and altruistic relation in the 2-nd period:
푈퐴1 = 푤1 − 퐶(푎1) + 훽 (푦˜1 − 푤1) + (1− 훽)휆푎1 + 휃 − (1 − 훽)휆푎
휇
1 =
= −퐶
(
푎푁퐴퐿
)
+ 푤1 + 훽(푦˜1 − 푤1) + 휃
For 푎′1 = 퐴
푁퐴
퐻 and NA relation in the 2-nd period
푈퐴1 = 푤1 − 퐶(푎1) + 훽 (푦˜1 − 푤1) + 휆푎1 + 휃 − 휆퐴
푁퐴
퐻 =
= −퐶
(
퐴푁퐴퐻
)
+ 푤1 + 훽 (푦˜1 − 푤1) + 휃
It is easy to see that the only difference is in the cost of effort. So, the
worker prefers (ex-ante) to establish Altruistic relation in the 2-nd period and
hence chooses effort 푎1 = 퐴
푁퐴
퐿 under non-altruistic relation in the 1-st period.
Intuition behind this is the following. Extra effort in the 1-st period might lead
to extra wage in the 2-nd period. But since the relation type in the 2-nd period
switches from Altruistic to Non-Altruistic, the extra effort is revealed and wage
in the 2-nd period will be adjusted accordingly.
The case of altruistic relation in the 1-st period (the node ** on the game
tree) is considered in the same manner.
This finishes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. 1. To establish the altruistic relation in the 1-st period, the two par-
ticipation constraints at the 1-st period – for the principal and for the Agent
should hold (we omit the index 1 to simplify notation in the proof).
IC for the Worker:
푤퐴 − 퐶
(
푎퐴
)
+ 훽
(
푦퐴 − 푤퐴
)
+ 푈퐴2 ≥ 푤
푁퐴 − 퐶
(
푎푁퐴
)
+ 훽
(
푦푁퐴 − 푤푁퐴
)
+ 푈퐴2
where the left-hand side is the workers’s total (period 1 and 2) utility on the
equilibrium path after establishing the altruistic relation in the 1-st period and
the right-hand side is the same for the case of non-altruistic relation in the 1-st
period.
Taking into account that 푦퐴 = 휃 + 퐴퐴퐿 , 푦
푁퐴 = 휃 + 퐴푁퐴퐿 , 푤
푁퐴 = 푦푁퐴,
푎퐴 = 퐴퐴퐿 , 푎
푁퐴 = 퐴푁퐴퐿
this gives:
푤퐴 ≥ 휃 +퐴푁퐴퐿 +
Δ퐶 − 훽Δ푎
1− 훽
(21)
IC for the Principal:
푦퐴 − 푤퐴 + 훼
(
푤퐴 − 퐶
(
푎퐴
))
+ 푉 퐴2 ≥ 푦
푁퐴 − 푤푁퐴 + 훼
(
푤푁퐴 − 퐶
(
푎푁퐴
))
+ 푉 퐴2
this gives:
푤퐴 ≤ 휃 +퐴푁퐴퐿 −
훼Δ퐶 −Δ푎
1− 훼
(22)
For the two inequalities (21) and (22) hold simultaneously, the following
inequality for the right-hand sides should hold:
휃 + 푎푁퐴퐿 −
훼Δ퐶 −Δ푎
1− 훼
≥ 휃 + 푎푁퐴퐿 +
Δ퐶 − 훽Δ푎
1− 훽
which gives
Δ퐶 ≤ Δ푎 (23)
2. It is clear that
Δ퐶 = 퐶(푎퐴퐿)− 퐶(푎
푁퐴
퐿 ) =
푎퐴퐿∫
푎푁퐴
퐿
퐶′(푥)푑푥 = 퐶′(휉)Δ푎
where 휉 is some point between 푎푁퐴퐿 and 푎
퐴
퐿 .
Since 퐶′() is increasing function, there will be 퐶′(푎푁퐴퐿 ) < 퐶
′(휉) < 퐶′
(
푎퐴퐿
)
where 푎푁퐴퐿 < 휉 < 푎
퐴
퐿
Since 퐶′(푎푁퐴퐿 ) = (1 − 훽)훿휆 and 퐶
′(푎푁퐴퐿 ) = (1 − 훽)훿휆 + 훽 one can obtain
퐶′(휉) = (1− 훽)훿휆 + 휂훽 where 0≤ 휂 ≤ 1.
Then
Δ퐶 = 퐶′(휉)Δ푎 = ((1 − 훽)훿휆+ 휂훽)Δ푎 (24)
which defines the function 휂(훽)
So, the condition for establishing altruistic relation (23) may be rewritten as
훿휆 ≤ 푟(훽) ≡
1− 휂(훽)훽
1− 훽
(25)
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It is clear from (25) that
lim
훽→0
푟(훽) = 1
since 0 ≤ 휂 ≤ 1 It is also clear that 1 − 휂훽 > 1 − 훽 unless 휂 = 0 which is the
case only if 퐶′ is constant, so
푟(훽) > 1 for훽 > 0
Now let us prove that 푟(훽) is increasing function. Consider 훽1 < 훽2. Let
Δ퐶푗 = 퐶(푎
퐴
퐿(훽푗))−퐶(푎
푁퐴
퐿 (훽푗)) and Δ푎푗 = 푎
퐴
퐿(훽푗)− 푎
푁퐴
퐿 (훽푗) for given 훿휆 > 1
such that altruistic relation is established for 훽1, i.e. Δ퐶1 < Δ푎1. First, we
prove that Δ퐶2 < Δ푎2.
Notice:
∙ 퐶′(푎퐴2 ) = 훽2 + (1− 훽2)훿휆 > 1 since this is weighted average with weights
훽2 and 1− 훽2 of 1 and 훿휆 > 1.
∙ 퐶′(푎푁퐴1 ) = (1 − 훽1)훿휆 < 1. Indeed, if this is not true then Δ퐶 =
푎퐴
1∫
푎푁퐴
1
퐶′(푥)푑푥 > Δ푎 because the function 퐶′(푥) > 1 for the whole range
푥 ∈
[
푎푁퐴퐿 , 푎
퐴
퐿
]
since 퐶′ is increasing and greater than 1 at the left side of
the interval.
∙ 푎푁퐴2 < 푎
푁퐴
1 since 퐶
′(푎푁퐴2 ) < 퐶
′(푎푁퐴1 ) where 퐶
′(푎푁퐴푗 ) = (1− 훽푗)훿휆
∙ 푎퐴2 < 푎
퐴
1 since 퐶
′(푎퐴2 ) < 퐶
′(푎퐴1 ) where 퐶
′(푎퐴푗 ) = 훽푗 + (1− 훽푗)훿휆
Consider now
Δ퐶2 −Δ푎2 =
푎퐴
2∫
푎푁퐴
2
퐶′(푥)푑푥 −
푎퐴
2∫
푎푁퐴
2
1푑푥 =
푎퐴
2∫
푎푁퐴
2
(퐶′(푥)− 1) 푑푥 =
=
푎푁퐴
1∫
푎푁퐴
2
(퐶′(푥)− 1) 푑푥+
푎퐴
1∫
푎푁퐴
1
(퐶′(푥)− 1) 푑푥−
푎퐴
1∫
푎퐴
2
(퐶′(푥)− 1) 푑푥 =
=
푎푁퐴
1∫
푎푁퐴
2
(퐶′(푥)− 1) 푑푥+ (Δ퐶1 −Δ푎1)−
푎퐴
1∫
푎퐴
2
(퐶′(푥)− 1) 푑푥
We have for the first integral
푎푁퐴
1∫
푎푁퐴
2
(퐶′(푥) − 1)푑푥 < 0 since 퐶′(푥) < 1 for
푥 ∈
[
푎푁퐴2 ; 푎
푁퐴
1
]
because 퐶′(푥) < 퐶′(푎푁퐴1 ) < 1 for these 푥.
For the last integral we have
푎퐴
1∫
푎퐴
2
(퐶′(푥)− 1) 푑푥 > 0 since 퐶′(푥) > 1 for
푥 ∈
[
푎퐴2 ; 푎
퐴
1
]
because 퐶′(푥) > 퐶′(푎퐴2 ) > 1 for these 푥.
So, finally we obtain
Δ퐶2 −Δ푎2 < Δ퐶1 −Δ푎1 < 0
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which means Δ퐶2 < Δ푎2.
The function 푟(훽) can be considered as the value of 훿휆 such that Δ퐶 = Δ푎.
We have proved that for all 훿휆 < 푟(훽1) holds Δ퐶2 < Δ푎2. So, to obtain Δ퐶2 =
Δ푎2 the value of 훿휆 should be higher then 푟(훽1), in other words 푟(훽2) > 푟(훽1).
So, we obtained that 푟(훽) is increasing function.
Finally, consider 훽 → 1. From the definition of 휂 in (24) we have Δ퐶 =
((1 − 훽)훿휆 + 휂훽)Δ푎. It is clear that Δ푎→ 1, Δ퐶 →
∫ 1
0
퐶′(푥)푑푥, as 훽 → 1. So
it’s easy to see that
lim
훽→1
휂(훽) = Δ퐶 = 퐶(1)− 퐶(0)
Then
lim
훽→1
푟(훽) = lim
훽→1
1− 휂훽
1− 훽
= lim
훽→1
(
휂(훽) +
1− 휂(훽)
1− 훽
)
= +∞
This finishes the proof.
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